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ver the last decade, public–private partnerships (ppps) have gained
momentum across the globe for delivering public services (Olson et al. 1998;
English and Guthrie 2003; Newberry and Pallot 2003). In the UK, one form of PPP,
which has been the subject of much debate and controversy, is the private finance
initiative (PFI) (Broadbent and Laughlin 1999, 2003a, 2003b). 
Accountability is a complex concept which has many alternative definitions as we will
discuss later in this paper. For the purpose of this paper, we define accountability in its
wider sense as the management of expectations of various stakeholders, often with
diverse and conflicting objectives. It is seen as both ethical (Dubnick 1998) and helpful
for improving performance (Barberis 1998; Cavalluzzo and Ittner 2004). Value-for-
money (VFM) decisions are taken as surrogate for performance in PFI and are thus
assumed to be a function of accountability. More and better accountability is therefore
expected to yield improved VFM decisions (assuming resources input remains the same)
in PFI. This assumed view is problematic and has received only scant attention in the
extant literature (see Demirag et al. 2003). The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to
develop a framework for better understanding the interaction between accountability
and VFM at the various stages of the PFI processes.
There is seemingly a consensus for a greater degree of accountability (Mayston 1999;
Cavalluzzo and Ittner 2004). However, the questions of what constitutes accountability,
what form or shape it takes, and to whom accountability should be addressed, require
further clarification (Gray and Jenkins 1993; Sinclair 1995; Schedler 1999; Mulgan
2000). It is these lacunae in the literature that this paper addresses. 
The PFI literature has mostly examined accountability issues (Mayston 1999; Ball et
al. 2001; Broadbent and Laughlin 2003a; Edwards and Shaoul 2003a, 2003b; Newberry
and Pallot 2003; Baker 2003) and value-for-money (VFM) issues (Froud and Shaoul
2001; Kirk and Wall 2001, 2002; Heald 2003; English and Guthrie 2003; Broadbent et
al. 2003a; Shaoul 2004; Edwards and Shaoul 2004), often dealing with them as they
arise and in an ad hoc manner. While most of these studies examined these concepts
in health, education, roads and information technology at the contract negotiation stage,
few explored PFI as a long-term staged process. 
This paper is organised as follows. The next section situates PFI in the context of new
public management (NPM) reforms, explains the meaning of and the government’s
justification for PFI. The following sections explore the accountability and VFM literature
on PFI and propose a framework for examining the types of accountability and their VFM
implications at the various stages of the PFI project. The last section provides some
conclusions and directions for further research.
New public management reforms and the UK’s 
private finance initiative
Over the last two decades, the UK’s public sector has been swept by various waves of
modernisation programmes aimed at increasing efficiency, transparency and account-
ability (Humphrey et al. 1993; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2004).1 These reforms, com-
monly known as the ‘new public management’ took various forms (Broadbent and
Guthrie 1992; Hood 1995). 
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1 The role of government in providing finance for the infrastructure of public services has been
increasingly questioned by a number of authors under the UK government’s modernisation agenda
(Broadbent and Laughlin 2004). This has broken down the traditional boundaries between the public
and private sectors.
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The Finance Management Initiative was introduced in 1982 (HM Government 1982)
to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector through delegation of
responsibility and measuring performance (Gray and Jenkins 1993). The Next Steps
Initiative was introduced in 1988 (Efficiency Unit 1988, 1991) to improve managerial
and political accountability in the public sector by making public-sector chief executives
directly accountable to ministers for the results and performance of their departments
(Hyndman and Eden 2002). The aim of the Comprehensive Spending Review (HM Trea-
sury 1998) and Resource Accounting and Resource Budgeting reforms (HM Treasury
2001) were to improve transparency and accountability through better management of
finances and accounting for taxpayers’ money (Talbot 2001; Mellett 2002). 
The push to adopt the private sector ‘contracting approach’ to public-sector service
provision can be traced back to compulsory competitive tendering (Parliament 1980),
best value (DETR 1998) and more recently PFI (HM Treasury 1997) (for further analysis
of the issues raised in these documents, see Broadbent and Laughlin 1999, 2003a,
2003b; Maile and Hoggett 2001; Midwinter 2001). PFI was officially introduced in 1992
by Chancellor Norman Lamont under John Major’s Conservative government (House
of Commons 1992) and was later embraced by Tony Blair’s Labour government when
it came to power in May 1997. It refers to the provision of public services such as schools,
hospitals, roads, prisons and defence through a private-sector consortium, which builds
and operates the required asset, the public sector purchasing its output, in exchange for
a stream of revenue payments over the contract period (HM Treasury 1997). It is one
form of public–private partnership (PPP). The latter is an umbrella term that refers to
the various forms of co-operation and collaboration between the private and public
sector, including: design, build, finance and operate (DBFO); build, own, operate and
transfer (BOOT); build, operate and transfer (BOT); and PFI (Schaeffer and Loveridge
2002). 
Despite this broad vision for PFI, more myopic perspectives have dominated its trans-
lation into actual policy. This is most evident in the UK Treasury’s formal justification
for PFI, which focused on the VFM at the point of design and procurement. For the
government, PFI provides better VFM than traditional procurement. Thus, VFM may be
achieved by leveraging private-sector expertise and creativity in PFI projects, the transfer
of appropriate risk to the private sector, and through better scope for innovation by the
private-sector contractors. The budget report (HM Treasury 2003a: 271) highlighted
these justifications for PFI as follows:
In addition to requiring capital investment to be undertaken by the private sector, the
ability of the private sector partner to be innovative and manage risks appropriately
allocated to it can result in a specified level of service at a price that represents value for
money . . . The Government is committed to developing PFI and other partnership
arrangements with the private sector to further enhance the delivery of public services
and to ensure the delivery of a higher sustainable level of public sector investment. The
Government wants to exploit all commercial potential and spare capacity in public sector
assets through a sensible balance of risk and reward.
The PFI policy has been challenged primarily because of differences in values and ethos
between the public and private sector and the wider implications of the role of the private
sector in the provision of welfare services (Broadbent and Laughlin 2003b). PFI is
attractive to a government facing pressure to increase investment in infrastructure on
the one hand and reduce public debt on the other (Mayston 1999; English and Guthrie
2003). It enables the provision of public services without the need for immediate or
direct capital outlay (Grimsey and Lewis 2002; Newberry and Pallot 2003). In addition,
it enables the government to avoid the ‘the political costs of raising taxes’ (Baker 2003:
447). 
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This short-sighted view of VFM shapes and drives PFI programmes and impacts
accountability. As we see in the review of the literature that follows, it also wreaks havoc
with the analysis of PFI. 
Accountability in PFI
Accountability is a complex, abstract and elusive concept (Sinclair 1995). It may be
defined as ‘an obligation to present an account of and answer for the execution of respon-
sibilities to those who entrusted those responsibilities’ (Gray and Jenkins 1993: 55).
Accountability itself takes various forms including communal, contractual, managerial
and parliamentary (Stewart 1984; Sinclair 1995; Laughlin 1996). The communal
accountability process involves meeting stakeholders’ needs through consultation and
seeking their involvement in the decision-making process. The contractual accountabil-
ity process involves entering into a legally binding agreement over standards of perfor-
mance by laying them down in writing and in specific enforceable terms. It involves the
creation of liabilities and obligation to comply through the judicial process (Dubnick
1998). Managerial accountability is the process of making ‘those with delegated author-
ity answerable for producing outputs or the use of resources to achieve certain ends’
(Sinclair 1995: 222). These relate to internal structures that are set up to implement,
monitor and evaluate programmes. Parliamentary accountability is the process of hold-
ing government executives to account for the policies they have pursued. In the UK, the
National Audit Office (NAO) and the Audit Commission conduct VFM investigations and
report their findings to the Public Accounts Committee. The latter acts on these reports
by calling on public-sector executives to account for their (in)action in cases where they
have failed to achieve VFM.
Mayston (1999: 349) criticises PFI on grounds of poor communal and managerial
accountability processes at the contract negotiation stage, and suggests that the PFI
‘process is unlikely to increase efficiency and accountability’ in the NHS. The reasons
given include: lack of freedom of public-sector managers to choose between PFI and
traditional procurement; secrecy and lack of accountability; high tender costs; and the
costs of risks transfer which are recouped from the public sector. Ball et al. (2001) argue
that PFI externalises costs to the future generation of taxpayers and that the rates of
return to equity holders are high because of high risk and high bidding costs which are
charged back to the public sector. They also argue that the private sector lacks innovative
behaviour in the case of school PFI projects. 
Broadbent and Laughlin (2003a) argue that governments are in a uniquely powerful
position to dictate NPM reform actions, and parliamentary institutions such as the NAO
and Audit Commission act as important vehicles to legitimise their PFI policies. The
accountability process here is a political rather than a managerial one. 
Newberry and Pallot (2003) argue that, in the case of New Zealand, PFI provides the
government with ‘a means of escape’ from tight constraints imposed by fiscal targets
and from public and parliamentary scrutiny. They argue that PFI commitments, which
are excluded from public-sector liabilities and estimates and in the process are not
reported to parliament, burden future generations of taxpayers and commit future
governments. In this respect, they advocate public-sector accounting reform to enable
the achievement of fiscal responsibility and transparency objectives. English and
Guthrie (2003) and Mayston (1999) reached similar conclusions about PFI activities in
the Australian and UK public sectors, respectively.
Baker (2003) suggests that the Enron business model, which has been facilitated by
deregulation in the US electricity and gas industries, is a PPP involving the private sector
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supplying public utilities. He argues that Enron was a business failure as well as an
accounting failure and that the government and accounting standard-setters need to
reconsider their contribution to the Enron scandal and their roles in allowing certain
(PFI) practices to become legitimate activities. Currently, various regulatory reforms
such as the introduction of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act 2002 and tighter non-consolidation
rules have been introduced in the wake of the Enron collapse to regulate accounting for
special purpose companies (SPCs).
Edwards and Shaoul (2003a) argue that it is doubtful whether, in the case of school
PFI projects, communal accountability processes are able to meet the needs of the school
stakeholders and deliver VFM particularly where there is a conflict of interests among
the stakeholders. They argue that the Pimlico School PFI failed because of the opposition
by school governors who raised concerns about the VFM case, lack of information on the
costs and nature of the facilities provided. 
Edwards and Shaoul (2003b: 397) examined two failed information technology PPPs
on an ex post basis to highlight the problems that arose as a result of failure of contractual
and managerial accountability processes. The authors showed that PPP contracts did not
transfer risks in the way that was expected primarily because they were hard to enforce,
provisions for compensation were inadequate, and it was difficult for the public sector
to ‘walk away’ because of the statutory nature of the services. They found that the public
agencies and the public at large, and not the private contractors, bore the management
risks and costs of failure. In this context Broadbent et al. (2003b) argue that, in practice,
PFI contracts are relationships based on grounds that if the contract is invoked the
working relationship may be compromised. 
It can be inferred from the accountability literature on PFI that communal, contrac-
tual, managerial and parliamentary accountability processes are important to obtain
VFM in PFI. These accountability processes are not distinct but are related and feed into
one another. The public sector is ultimately accountable to public service consumers
and taxpayers. This implies that contractual, managerial and parliamentary accountabil-
ity processes need to feed back to the communal accountability process. But there is also
a need for the actors to address and work within the parameters of authority and
objectives set forth by the legislation, and thus to connect to parliamentary accountabil-
ity. The means for accomplishing this are manifest in the contractual and managerial
accountability mechanisms that emerge in the PFI process. Table 1 shows the various
ways in which current studies of PFI have examined accountability issues related to these
interconnected accountability systems found in different PFI contexts.
VFM in PFI
The Green Book (HM Treasury 2003b) and ‘Partnerships for Prosperity’ (HM Treasury
1997) provide guidance on PFI appraisal and ‘how’ VFM is achieved through PFI contract-
ing. But, as noted, the narrow perspective assumed by the Treasury does not adequately
define ‘what’ is meant by VFM and ‘for whom’ VFM is to be achieved. This is a theme
reflected in the academic literature on VFM (see e.g. Mayston 1999; Shaoul 2004). As
we will discuss below, the government has put procedures in place to ensure that only
projects that are capable of delivering VFM over their lifetimes will be approved.
Implied in VFM is the existence of—and need for—a standard by which to guide and
assess PFI-related decisions and actions. Many researchers view VFM as an ‘investigation’
to determine how resources have been utilised. Glynn (1985) and Jacobs (1998) define
VFM as an ‘examination’ to determine whether an organisation is performing economi-
cally, efficiently and effectively in its use of resources, operations, procedures and pur-
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suit of objectives (Jacobs 1998). According to Glynn (1985: 29), economy is ‘acquiring
resources of an appropriate quality for the minimum cost’. Efficiency is about ensuring
that maximum output is obtained from a given amount of resources devoted or, con-
versely, that a minimum level of resources is devoted to a given level of output (Glynn
1985). Effectiveness is about ensuring ‘that the output from any given activity is
achieving the desired results’ (Glynn 1985). Although the economy aspects of VFM are
relatively easy to quantify, assessing policy efficiency and effectiveness is more difficult.
This is primarily because of the difficulties involved in measuring output (to assess
efficiency) and outcome (to assess effectiveness).
With its focus narrowed on design and procurement issues, the Treasury’s VFM
publications on PFI mostly consider the narrow ‘economy’ dimension of VFM at the
expense of other non-quantifiable ideals. For example, the Treasury (1997: para. 3.10)
states that ‘value for money will need to be demonstrated by comparison of private sector
PFI bids with a detailed public sector comparator (PSC)’. The PSC (also known as the
reference project) is the ‘purportedly neutral benchmark’ of the most efficient form of
public-sector delivery (English and Guthrie 2003: 504). The Green Book (HM Treasury
2003b) explains that the PSC is a discounted cash flow analysis of the costs to the public
sector of providing the public service. Risks transferred to the private sector are added
to these costs to obtain the ‘risk-adjusted PSC’ which is then compared with PFI bids.
The difference is called VFM.
Accordingly, the NAO’s VFM auditing ‘analytical framework’ and VFM reports are
wholly dedicated to ‘examining PFI projects as they are agreed between the public sector
clients and the private sector suppliers’ at the contract negotiation stage (NAO 1999: 1).
Shaoul (2004: 8) concurs by stating that the NAO’s VFM audit has ‘for a variety of
conceptual reasons focussed on economy rather efficiency and effectiveness’. Shaoul
(2004) further argues that the VFM appraisal considers public-sector costs rather than
wider societal issues and that the VFM benefits of PFI compared with traditional pro-
curement, in the NHS, are marginal and subjective. 
The bias of the myopic focus on the design and procurement stages of the PFI is most
evident in the accounting procedures established for VFM. The central concerns of the
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Table 1 pfi accountability studies
StudyPublication Research method
Identifies a number of areas for concern over PFI contracting
in the NHS
Mayston 1999 Case study
Debate VFM and the generational accountability of school PFI
contracts
Ball et al. 2001 Case study
Examine the process of control and ‘legitimation’ in the public
sector by using the example of the UK’s PFI
Broadbent and
Laughlin 2003a
Literature review
Examine government financial management accountability
processes in New Zealand that encourage PPP
Newberry and Pallot
2003
Literature review
Examines the unintended consequences of deregulation on
PPP activities by examining Enron
Baker 2003 Case study
Explore the PFI appraisal process and the reasons why the
Pimlico School PFI failed to reach financial close
Edwards and Shaoul
2003a
Case study and interviews
Examine some of the problems that the public sector faces
when PFI contracts fail
Edwards and Shaoul
2003b
Case study and interviews
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accounting mechanisms are over certain types of risk and how they are allocated between
the government and the PFI contractor. From the Treasury’s perspective (HM Treasury
1997: 11), there are seven types of risk involved in PFI contracting: design and construc-
tion risks; commissioning and operating risks; demand (or usage) risks; residual value
risks; technology and obsolescence risks; regulation (including taxation and planning
permission) risks; and project financing risks. According to the Treasury, VFM is
achieved through the optimal allocation of these risks between the public and private
partners (HM Treasury 1997).2 However, for the purpose of PFI accounting, not all PFI
risks are relevant. According to Financial Reporting Standard (FRS) 5 (ASB 1998), a party
has to account for the underlying PFI assets in its financial statements if it bears the
risks and benefits of the assets. The UK’s Accounting Standards Board (ASB) places more
emphasis on demand risks and residual value risks in determining which party owns
the underlying PFI assets. Construction risks, which are relevant for VFM analysis, are
not relevant for PFI accounting on the grounds that they crystallise before the PFI asset
is built. 
Kirk and Wall (2002) argue that because the government is keen to keep PFI off the
public sector’s balance sheet it would pass on risk to the private sector, which might not
represent VFM. In this respect, the authors question whether the ASB’s rule may have
reduced VFM for PFI schemes. Kirk and Wall (2001) further argue that, although both
the Treasury and the ASB might agree on PFI accounting principles, the implication of
the related properties remaining off the public sector’s balance sheet might mean that
the objective of providing VFM to the public may not be achieved. Heald (2003) concurs
by stating that PFI accounting and VFM analysis should not be concerned with the risk
transferred to or shared with the private sector but with total risks and the amount of
risk borne by the public sector. Nevertheless, the author argues that academic
researchers cannot gain access to PFI information for a comprehensive analysis of
accounting and VFM. In this respect, Broadbent et al. (2003a) state that this assessment
should be left to parliamentary institutions as they have better access to PFI information.
Froud and Shaoul (2001) argue that the risks transfer process at the contract appraisal
stage is subjective because it is difficult to identify, allocate and value risks. This problem
is compounded by the fact that it is hard to assess the extent to which risks have really
been transferred to private-sector contractors who use special purpose companies to
limit their liabilities. The authors found that there is inadequate explanation of the
methodology used for assessing and valuing risks in NHS PFI contracts.
English and Guthrie (2003) highlight the importance of parliamentary scrutiny by
public-sector auditors to achieve VFM. They argue that PFI outcome depends on public
policy parameters issued by PFI regulators and their implementation at the micro
organisational level through interactions with PFI stakeholders. In particular, they argue
that the Australian government is using PFI because of its commitment to adopt NPM
reforms and the desire to reduce public debts. In addition to the PSC, the public interest
test (PIT), which involves assessing the ‘positive (or negative) environmental conse-
quences’ of PFI policies, is used to achieve VFM at the contract negotiation stage (English
and Guthrie 2003: 504). The authors posit that, at the micro organisational level,
governments are not as successful as private-sector consortia at identifying and shifting
risk and hence at achieving VFM. Nevertheless, they argue that ex post monitoring mecha-
nisms such as parliamentary scrutiny are important for achieving VFM.
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2 Two recent studies (see Flyvbjerg et al. 2002 and Mott MacDonald 2002) show that traditional
procurement suffers from cost overruns and delays in relation to PFI contracts, provided that budgets
for these contracts are set realistically. In this respect, Grimsey and Lewis (in this issue) argue that
PFI may provide better VFM by reducing these costs and delays through better project management.
However, Edwards and Shaoul (2004) found that the public sector paid a higher premium to ensure
that road PFI contracts were built to budget and on time.
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Broadbent et al. (2003a) also argue that monitoring of PFI projects over their lifetime
(usually 25–30 years, depending on negotiation) is an important mechanism for
achieving VFM. They criticise PFI on the grounds that little thought has been given to
the design of post-project evaluation systems of PFI contracts and their operation. In this
respect, they propose an evaluation framework, which would draw from pre-PFI imple-
mentation VFM financial and non-financial appraisal considerations to provide
‘pointers’ for relevant factors to be considered for evaluation. They argue that this system
should primarily be the responsibility of the NAO and Audit Commission who have an
important ‘control and legitimation’ role to play (Broadbent and Laughlin 2003a). 
Surveys of public- and private-sector managers conducted by Pricewaterhouse-
Coopers (1999), ACCA (2002) and Ernst & Young (2002) also reveal that VFM and risk
transfer processes are subjective and that PFI may not be having a beneficial effect on
public services. The PricewaterhouseCoopers (1999) survey of 140 senior decision-
makers revealed that 74% of private-sector managers and 84% of public-sector man-
agers believe that PFI enables the public sector to procure services that they would
otherwise have to do without. Only 13% of private-sector managers and 35% of public-
sector managers believe that the PFI procurement is carried out efficiently; 14% of
private-sector managers and 23% of public-sector managers believe that the government
has the necessary skills to procure and manage projects well; and only 24% of private-
sector managers and 47% of public-sector managers believe that the public sector is
capable of writing output specifications to achieve VFM.
ACCA (2002) conducted a survey of 200 of its members in the public sector. According
to the survey, 42% did not think PFI is beneficial to public services; 57% did not believe
that PFI provides VFM; 57% agreed that, because PFI is now the only procurement route,
public organisations are prevented from achieving VFM; 58% did not believe that PFI
schemes are all objectively tested for VFM; 28% strongly disagree that PFI enables public-
sector organisations to benefit from private-sector expertise; 39% would not opt for
private-sector involvement in future, if they were able to choose freely between PFI and
traditional procurement; and 48% would not advise other organisations to use the PFI
route.
Ernst & Young (2002) conducted a survey of 26 public-sector CEOs in the NHS who
had procured buildings and services through PFI. According to the survey, 88% had their
facilities delivered according to plan; over 50% believed that there is either no or limited
knowledge sharing in PFI; over 70% perceived the relationship between themselves and
the PFI provider as being average or better; only 57% of respondents believed the current
output specifications, performance regimes and monitoring systems are manageable;
over 85% stated that response from the public has been positive; 70% stated that the
response from clinical and non-clinical staff has been positive; 85% believed that PFI is
flexible in terms of variations mechanisms.
As indicated in Table 2, the PFI literature has mostly focused on examining VFM at
the contract negotiation stage (PricewaterhouseCoopers 1999; Mayston 1999; Froud
and Shaoul 2001; ACCA 2002; Shaoul 2004). Accordingly, these studies have criticised
the financial appraisal of VFM, including the uncertainty involved in predicting future
cash flows, the subjectivity involved in risks transfer processes and the discount rate
used in the appraisal. English and Guthrie (2003) and Broadbent et al. (2003a) highlight
the importance of investigations carried out by parliamentary institutions to achieve
VFM. Edwards and Shaoul (2004) examined the ex post facto VFM and accountability
issues in the context of roads PFI contracts, which they argue are under-researched.
Nevertheless, we argue that most of these studies have failed to consider VFM as a long-
term process and have not explored the importance of the various types of accountability
and their VFM implications. In addition, the implications of post-implementation VFM
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monitoring by public-sector managers, contractors, users and other stakeholders seem
to have been ignored by PFI researchers. 
Towards an understanding of the linkages between types of
accountability and VFM in PFI 
The analysis above shows that many studies have examined and raised numerous
accountability and VFM issues at specific stages of the PFI process. The Treasury’s
guidance on PFI also places much emphasis on the early implementation and set-up
stages at the expense of the post-implementation stages (see Appendix). No attempt has
been made to link the relevant types of accountability and VFM at the various stages of
the PFI processes. We have attempted to conduct such an analysis by identifying five
stages of the PFI process and the VFM drivers and the forms of accountability relevant
to the various stages. This is illustrated in Table 3.
PFI procurement is initiated through an assessment of business objectives, needs and
constraints including that of affordability. An outline business case (OBC), specifying
the output requirements, is prepared by the public-sector agency in consultation with
JCC 15 Autumn 2004 71
a framework for examining accountability and value for money in the uk’s private finance initiative
Table 2 pfi vfm studies
StudyPublication Research method
Survey of public- and private-sector managers to assess their
perceptions about VFM in PFI 
Pricewaterhouse-
Coopers 1999
Survey
Examine the process of VFM appraisal in the NHS at the
contract negotiation stage, mostly through a critique of the
Treasury’s Green Book
Froud and Shaoul
2001
Case study
Examine accounting for PFI and the VFM implications for PFI
assets remaining off the public sector’s balance sheet 
Kirk and Wall 2001 Analysis of comments to
the ASB
Question whether the ASB’s PFI accounting rule has reduced
the scheme’s VFM
Kirk and Wall 2002 Case studies
Survey of ACCA members in the public sector to assess their
perceptions about VFM in PFI
ACCA 2002 Survey
Examine accountability and VFM on an ex post facto basis in
the context of roads PFI contracts in the UK
Edwards and Shaoul
2004
Case study
Examine the macro-economic justification for PFI and its
implementation at the organisational level
English and Guthrie
2003
Literature review
Propose a framework for evaluating PFI for VFM in the NHSBroadbent et al.
2003a
Case studies and
interviews
Criticises the ex ante VFM appraisal of PFI contractsShaoul 2004 Case study
Examines the interaction between VFM and accounting for PFIHeald 2003 Literature review
Survey of public-sector CEOs in the NHS to examine their VFM
perceptions of the NHS buildings and services provided under
PFI
Ernst & Young 2002 Survey
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PFI stakeholders. It involves assessing the costs and benefits of the various options
including do nothing, do minimum, traditional procurement (PSC) and PFI. The
accountability relationship at this stage is mostly communal as it involves stakeholders
specifying ‘what’ services are required to satisfy their needs. The objective of this stage
is to reach consensus among stakeholders that PFI or the traditional procurement alter-
native represents better VFM. 
The set-up stage involves the creation of a project board and project team. The project
board has the power to make decisions and is usually made up of senior members from
the public-sector procuring agency (for example, the CEO and project manager) and
representatives from the government department providing the funding. On the other
hand, the project team is responsible for taking the project forward, negotiating with
the PFI contractors and ensuring that service requirements, as specified by the various
stakeholders in the previous stage, are incorporated into PFI contracts. It usually com-
prises a project manager, representatives from the user community, consultants and
members with technical expertise. The accountability relationship at this stage is mostly
contractual as it involves putting performance standards in writing. The VFM drivers at
this stage involve fulfilment of the needs of the public-sector stakeholders. 
Once contractual terms and conditions are agreed, contracts are signed and imple-
mented. This involves construction and delivery of the PFI assets and provision of
services by the private-sector contractor. The accountability relationship is mostly mana-
gerial; it involves checking that the PFI assets and services are delivered efficiently and
effectively according to terms stipulated in the contracts. The VFM drivers involve assess-
ing the suitability of PFI services in meeting the objectives and needs identified at the
initiation stage.
The progress of PFI projects is monitored internally by the public-sector procuring
agency through monthly operational review meetings and quarterly strategic review
meetings. The accountability relationship at this stage is mostly managerial. Operational
review meetings involve project managers, the PFI facilities manager and users, who
would monitor services, change orders, complaints and maintenance issues among
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Table 3 accountability, vfm and the pfi processes
Description of the stage Forms of accountability PFI stage Value-for-money (VFM)
drivers
Treasury guidance steps 1–3 (see
Appendix)
Communal1. Initiation Consensus that PFI is
cheaper than the PSC
Treasury guidance steps 4–13 (see
Appendix)
Contractual2. Set-up Fulfilment
Treasury guidance step 14 (see
Appendix )
Managerial3. Implementation Efficiency and
effectiveness
Progress of PFI contracts is monitored
through operational review meetings
with public-sector project managers,
private-sector facilities managers and
users of the service
Managerial4. Internal
monitoring
Efficiency and
effectiveness
PFI contracts are assessed for VFM by
the NAO and Audit Commission and
findings are reported to parliament,
representing public interest
Parliamentary5. External
monitoring
Policy goal
achievement
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others. This would form the basis for paying contractors’ monthly unitary payments.
Quarterly meetings involve senior representatives from the public-sector and the
private-sector service providers to discuss current progress and future strategic direc-
tions of PFI. At this stage, user satisfaction surveys may be carried out to assess the
efficiency and effectiveness of PFI in meeting their needs.
External monitoring of PFI contracts is carried out by parliamentary institutions such
as the NAO and Audit Commission. They mainly examine PFI contracts, as agreed
between the public-sector and private-sector service provider and the delivery of PFI
services according to terms contractually agreed. Their reports are tabled in the Public
Accounts Committee and are generally available to the public. The VFM drivers at this
stage relate to examining whether PFIs are achieving policy goals and whether they have
applied in the public interest.
The above five-staged process may be used as a generic framework for further
investigating the stakeholders involved, their accountability perceptions and VFM
expectations from the PFI process. However, given the nature of PFI, VFM is necessarily
a long-term and dynamic process which needs to be assessed over the life of the contract.
In this respect, VFM is contingent on accommodating the changing expectations of
stakeholders and would be based on a continuous assessment of how PFI is meeting
stakeholders’ needs over time.
Summary and conclusions
The objective of this paper was to evaluate the accountability and VFM literature on PFI
and to examine the relationships between these concepts. In this respect, we have
proposed a five-staged framework for further researching and understanding the
accountability relationships and the VFM drivers relevant at the various stages.
We argue that most PFI studies have examined the initiation and set-up stages where
PFI contracts are being negotiated and very few studies have explored the accountability
and VFM issues arising at the important implementation and monitoring stages.
Moreover, these studies have not examined PFI as comprising various interrelated stages
with different types of accountability and VFM driver. 
Communal and contractual forms of accountability seem to be more dominant at the
initiation and set-up stages of the PFI process. The first stage involves reaching consen-
sus among the various stakeholders about the best procurement option to meet their
expectations and needs. Service requirements are then incorporated into detailed con-
tracts which are expected to fulfil those needs. These pre-contract stages which, in most
cases, last for up to three years, have important implications for the duration of the PFI
contract.
Managerial and parliamentary forms of accountability are required to ensure that PFI
objectives are met. Implementation and internal monitoring processes feed back to the more
specific PFI stakeholders whereas external monitoring processes feed back to the general
public. Further research at these stages might involve examining the extent to which the
PFI meets the VFM objectives identified at the pre-contract stages. In addition, the
accountability perceptions and VFM expectations of the diverse stakeholders involved in
the implementation and monitoring process may be examined. 
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Appendix: the PFI procurement process
q
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DescriptionSteps
Procurement proceeds only after a rigorous examination of business objectives, needs and
constraints including that of affordability.
1. Establish business
needs
The cost and benefits of the various options including do nothing, do minimum, traditional
procurement and PFI are examined.
2. Appraise options
An OBC, supporting the case for investment and for the PFI approach, based on the
options appraisal, is prepared. It specifies the output specification rather than ‘how’ the
service is to be delivered. A reference project, usually a public sector comparator (PSC), is
prepared for benchmarking purposes. 
3. Prepare an outline
business case (OBC) and a
reference project
A procurement team, led by a full-time project manager, and a project steering board to
which it reports and which can take decisions, are appointed. The project team needs to
include people with the relevant skills required in the PFI negotiation process and users.
4. Create a project team
and project board
This involves deciding how much information to request at the pre-qualification, when to
seek fully costed proposals and when to select a preferred bidder.
5. Decide tactics
Advertisement includes explanation of the project, indication of the information required
for any assessment of the potential supplier’s economic and financial standing and
technical capacity, and the criteria for award.
6. Invite expressions of
interest; publish Official
Journal of European
Community (OJEC) notice
The general competence of the interested suppliers is assessed. Proposals for the
particular project are not covered.
7. Pre-qualify bidders
Bidders are shortlisted based on specific competence (e.g. risks management). Bidders not
taken forward are informed and debriefed quickly on why they were not selected.
8. Shortlist bidders 
The OBC and any PSC are further refined in the light of new information. The affordability
and funding arrangements are reaffirmed.
9. Refine the appraisal
The ITN specifies the services required in output terms; the constraints on the project
scope; the proposed contractual terms (lengths and payment mechanism); the criteria for
evaluation of bids and the scope for variant bids (such as variations on proposed contracts
duration, risk allocation).
10. Invitation to negotiate
(ITN)
Bids received are evaluated in accordance with the principles and criteria set out in the ITN
document. From the best and final offers received, the preferred bidder is then chosen.
11. Receipt and evaluation
of bids
The preferred bidder is selected and the PFI proposition is retested against the key VFM
and affordability criteria. Risks transferred to the private sector under PFI are costed and
added to the PSC. The expected accounting treatment of the contract is reconfirmed with
the client’s auditors.
12. Selection of the
preferred bidder and the
final evaluation
Once the contract is signed and a contract award notice placed in the OJEC, the contract is
implemented.
13. Contract award and
financial close
New processes, systems and management systems are put in place.14. Contract management
Source: Adapted from HM Treasury 1997, 1999
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